What do ordinary citizens in the Arab world really think about the Islamic State? -Washington Post


This issue has already been discussed on this blog

See: https://jtdevinemta.wordpress.com/2014/10/15/isis-has-almost-no-popular-support-in-egypt-saudi-arabia-or-lebanon-washington-institute/

However it is worth reiterating the point:

“The findings were stark: Not many Arabs sympathize with the Islamic State. The percent agreeing with the Islamic State’s goals range from 0.4 percent in Jordan to 6.4 percent in the Palestinian territories. The percent agreeing with the Islamic State’s use of violence range from 0.4 percent in Morocco to 5.4 percent in the Palestinian territories. The percent agreeing that the Islamic State’s tactics are compatible with Islam range from 1.0 percent in Jordan to 8.9 percent n the Palestinian territories.”




Here’s how we talk about manhood — and womanhood — during a presidential race -Washington Post


That reinforces the notion that femininity and feminine qualities are not leadership qualities. That may indirectly contribute to the idea that women — who are more likely to be thought of as feminine — aren’t naturally suited to politics. New research finds overt media bias against women to be waning. Nevertheless, we know that women express lower levels of political ambition, and women are less likely to think they are qualified for politics. That could be because of the way our political discussions gender good politicians as masculine, especially during presidential elections, our highest-profile races.”

See: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/27/heres-how-we-talk-about-manhood-and-womanhood-during-a-presidential-race/


Inside a Failed Coup and Turkey’s Fragmented Military -War on the Rocks


This post from the blog War on the Rocks has a slightly different take on Turkey’s failed coup than the current dominant narrative which paints the attempted putsch as a very small, disorganized, and incompetent affair. This interpretation of events has serious implications for the lessons we draw from the events. As the author suggests, the Turkish military remains deeply divided. To the extent this is account is accurate, it is difficult to give credence to the conspiracy theories that suggest Erdogan faked the coup to provide a pretext for a power-grab.

“The story of the coup suggests a relatively large plot that drew support from numerous parts of the Turkish Armed Forces, spanning various commands around Turkey. The number of senior officers involved, including the commander of Incirlik air force base where U.S. aircraft are now based for the fight against the Islamic State, suggest that the Turkish military is divided. The narrative following the coup is that this was a small, ill-conceived group of plotters who failed to overthrow the elected government, but this narrative is at odds with information coming out about the extent of the plot. This was a larger and far more credible attempt than has thus far been reported.

The fact that this was relatively well planned — if hastily implemented — coup attempt has several implications — namely that the Turkish military’s senior leadership is deeply factionalized, with one sizeable minority of officers willing to use force, even though their decision risked civil war. This suggests that Turkey is unstable and faces serious challenges in the near term in ways that will surely impact American and Western security interests in the Middle East and Europe.”

Inside a Failed Coup and Turkey’s Fragmented Military

ISU 2016


The following post is for my students at ISU in Marburg 2016.

Welcome to:

Authoritarian Politics and Democratization in the Middle East: From the 1990s to the Arab Spring




  • Participation and Presentation 30%
  • Map quiz 20%
  • Take Home Essay #1 25%
  • Take Home Essay #2 25%


  • Schedule:
Class Topic Case(s) Readings
1 Introduction
2 Middle Eastern Exceptionalism & Political Culture 1
3 Coercive Institutions Syria & Libya 2
4 Rentier Politics & Map Quiz Saudi Arabia 3
5 Elections and Authoritarian Politics Egypt & Tunisia 4
6 Political Liberalization and Authoritarian Politics Jordan 5
7 Consociational Politics Lebanon & Iraq 6
8 Gender Iran 7 & 8
9 The United States


  • Readings:



  1. Y. Sadowski, “The New Orientalism in the Democracy Debate” Middle East Report No. 183 p.1-7
  2. Bassam Haddad Syria’s Curious Dilemma Middle East Report On Line Vol. 35, 2005 http://www.merip.org/mer/mer236/syrias-curious-dilemma
  3. Steffen Hertog A Rentier Social Contract: The Saudi Political Economy since 1979 Middle East Institute October 2009 http://www.mei.edu/content/rentier-social-contract-saudi-political-economy-1979
  4. Marsha Pripstein Posusney, “Behind the Ballot Box: Electoral Engineering in the Arab World” Middle East Report, No. 209, (Winter, 1998), pp. 12-15+42
  5. Curtis Ryan, Reform Retreats Amid Jordan’s Political Storms, Middle East Report On Line, June 10, 2005 http://www.merip.org/mero/mero061005
  6. Canadians For Justice and Peace in the Middle East, Factsheet: Understanding Lebanese Confessionalism Factsheet Series No. 26, May 2007 http://www.cjpmo.org/DisplayDocument.aspx?DocumentID=47
  7. Ervand Abrahamian Why the Islamic Republic Has Survived Middle East Report No. 250, 2009 http://www.merip.org/mer/mer250/why-islamic-republic-has-survived
  8. Deniz Kandiyoti Women, “Islam and the State” Middle East Report No.173 1991


Presentation Schedule:

Class #4 21-Jul
Syria: Emily & Sam



Class #5 22-Jul
Libya: Hanna & Dorathee



Class #6 25-Jul

Saudi Arabia: Shouq & Aisha
Egypt: Bobby & John


Click to access president%20approval%20rate-%20April2016-%20En.pdf

Class #7 26-Jul

Tunisia: Blake & Aysha & Dan
Lebanon: Rachel and Ahmed

Class #8 27-Jul
Iran: Jonathan and Jesse


Iran: Rose-Helen & Johdalys

Why Turkey’s coup failed -VOX, Rudaw & Various


After a night of uncertainty, Recep Tayyip Erdogan remains in power. Initial reports seemed to indicate that the coup was well organized and on the verge of succeeding. However the plot came unraveled relatively quickly. In the aftermath, there have been mass arrests of military personnel and political opponents, and reports of vigilante justice handed out by pro-Erdogan mobs. See http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/turkish-soldier-beheaded-pro-government-8433319 but be warned, the images are graphic and disturbing.

There are many questions to be answered. The first is why stage a coup? There are a number of reasons why part of the military would want to overthrow Erdogan. Once a major success story, Erdogan’s foreign policy had floundered since the Arab Spring. Not only has Turkey been growing increasingly isolated, his missteps had helped pave the way for Rojava, an independent Kurdish enclave in Northern Syria. They also left Turkey open to terrorist attacks from ISIS. His foreign policy had in fact broken down to the point where the Foreign Minister was sacked and several key policies were reversed. Ties were restored with Israel and overtures made to Moscow and reportedly Damascus as well.

On the domestic front, Erdogan’s reopened the civil war with the PKK, leading to bombings in major cities, and making parts of south eastern Turkey look like Syria. (See: http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/140720162 and  http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/turkey-thousands-kurds-flee-historic-sur-district-diyarbakir-curfew-expanded-1540429  Note: several of the images that cycle through the frame at the top right of this blog were taken in Diyarbakir in 2011 before the most recent fighting). Step by step, Erdogan was also concentrating all of the power of the state within his own hands. In doing so he was undermining the country’s nascent democracy and threatening the remaining secular traditions of the Turkish state that the military had historically preserved. To make matters worse, he had embarked on an anti-Gülen crusade that threatened anyone not loyal to Erdogan and the AK Party.  Muhammed Fethullah Gülen was once Erdogan’s ally, but after a falling out in 2013,  Gülen and his followers were branded as subversives. This may have forced the coup leaders’ hand: Either act, or risk being purged.

Given Tukey’s history of coups (see http://www.vox.com/2016/7/16/12204508/turkey-military-coups-history) perhaps the more pressing questions were why did it not happen sooner, and how could it have failed? The answers to the two questions are partially intertwined. Since taking office Erdogan has replaced key members of the military elite, and changed its culture through recruitment and indoctrination. What was once an institution with a strong, coherent secular identity, and a reliable chain of command has become divided -to say the least. There are still some remnants of the old guard, but most of the senior command and a large part of the rank and file are pro-Erdogan, pro-AK. That makes launching a coup so much more complicated. In the past, secular generals could be sure they were all of the same mind and that their underlings would follow their orders. Not any more. As was clearly evident last night, the military was divided with key mobile units remaining loyal to the government. See VOX  (http://www.vox.com/2016/7/16/12205352/turkey-coup-failed-why)

As the VOX article discusses, the plotters also made some fundamental errors. Most obviously, they did not capture Erdogan in the initial stages of the coup. As long as he remained free, he could rally the loyal parts of the military and his civilian supporters to his side. In a sense, there was a logic to the plotter’s strategy. Erdogan was out of the capital on vacation, that left him out of touch and somewhat vulnerable. But the plotters did not count on the availability of social media and Erdogan’s charisma. They also failed to take advantage of the brief period when the controlled the regular media. They were not able to convince enough of the military that they were going to win and that they had a plan. (see the blog War is Boring for a discussion of the battle for perceptions https://warisboring.com/turkish-coup-plotters-lost-the-battle-of-perception-fbb695cbe442#.k976qx5br). These were fatal mistakes.

Finally, one of the most surprising elements of the story is the support Erdogan received  from world leaders and even his opponents, including Kurdish groups. (See:  http://aranews.net/2016/07/kurds-turkish-opposition-parties-reject-military-coup/) There is no one answer to this. From a western perspective, Erdogan is the leader of a NATO state and an elected one at that. Turning on him during a coup was never likely. In the Middle East, few leaders like to see a coup take place. Its a bad precedent for them even if they don’t like the leader. For the domestic opposition, certainly there was a realization that a coup meant the end of elections for the foreseeable future and the loss of what ever gains they had made under the system. Finally, the Iraqi Kurds in Erbil have carved out a working relationship with the Erdogan government which also gives them leverage vis-a-vis Baghdad. A new military government would be an unknown quantity. (See David Romano’s piece in RUDAW http://rudaw.net/english/opinion/16072016).

Successful coups rarely give rise to democracy, no matter how awful the established leader was. When they fail, they make a bad situation worse.

More links:

Turkey coup: Who was behind Turkey coup attempt? http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36815476

Turkey was already undergoing a slow-motion coup – by Erdoğan, not the army